American Entry into the Second World War

The U.S. entry into World War Two is a hotly debated topic with diverging opinions and this is no different when examining the two articles “The Global Threat and the Case for War” by Gerhard Weinberg and “Stalemate and the Case Against U.S. Entry into the War” by Bruce M. Russett. Weinberg’s thesis resides around the notion that Roosevelt had hoped to avoid total conflagration with Germany while doing the same with Japan while insisting they leave China. Russett on the other hand in his article states that while America might have stated publicly that they wanted to remain neutral their actions suggested otherwise.

Weinberg in his writing suggests that initially American officials and the American public while leery of Germany and Japan wished to remain neutral and at arms length from another European entanglement. But the threat of Germany and Japan winning in their respective theatres would change the balance of power in the world to such a degree that America itself would then be threatened – even by invasion. Weinberg holds the belief that Hitler wished open conflict with America and was even gearing his own war machine to that very end and as such Roosevelt and the American people had no choice but to not only aid the enemies of the Axis powers but prepare the American people to become involved to stave off a feared German invasion of American soil. Weinberg cites the sending of supplies to the Soviets and Britain as the means to this end as it also helped re-establish America’s own rearmament program.

In the East, Weinberg asserts that American negotiations with Japan to find a mutual settlement were still possible right up to December 7. What ruined this possible outcome for Weinberg was pressure on Japan by Germany to attack British holdings in the East, Hitler’s wish to have Japanese naval power on his side, and internal pressure among the Japanese military hierarchy.

Russett’s position is a major contrast to that of Weinberg. Russett writes that American involvement in World War Two brought them few gains, and the assertion that Germany may not have been able to win against Britain and the Soviets, and instead a stalemate of sorts may have come about without direct American involvement in the war. And if the Allied powers were about to be finally finished off, America could have waited until that crucial time to enter the fray.

Russett also suggests that paranoia of sorts was setting in with the American public with their fear of a German invasion. Weinberg finds this as reasoning for further American involvement in the West.

It is in the East and the war against Japan that Russett really takes a differing approach from that of Weinberg. Russett holds that it was the actions of the Allied powers that pushed Japan into its fateful decision to attack Pearl Harbour and the other Allies in the Eastern theatre of war. American insistence that Japan withdraw from China while being cut-off from raw materials was too much for Japan to bear and in the end cornered them to such a degree that they had to strike. Russett states a long series of mutually antagonistic acts had taken place between the great powers and this helped lead to the outbreak of war.

Both authors seem to agree that for the most part Roosevelt and the American people wished to remain neutral while openly hoping for the Allied powers to win the day. The authors use different rationale for the reasoning behind the political movements of the American government before the declaration of war upon them. For me Russett takes the more long reaching look at the war and the realist view of the true power of Germany and Japan and their ability to strike the North American continent. Weinberg seems to cling to the Hollywood notion of an American government and people facing down a dire enemy through little fault of their own. For those reasons I find myself more in agreement with Russett’s position than that of Weinberg.